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CRYING HAVOC OVER THE OUTSOURCING OF 
SOLDIERS AND DEMOCRACY‘S SLIPPING GRIP 
ON THE DOGS OF WAR 
Joshua S. Press* 
He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to 
compleat the works of death, desolation, and tyranny, already begun with 
circumstances of Cruelty & Perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbar-
ous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.† 
Whenever a people . . . entrust the defence of their country to a regu-
lar, standing army, composed of mercenaries, the power of that country will 
remain under the direction of the most wealthy citizens.‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 16, 2007, as U.S. diplomats met at a secured compound 
in Baghdad, a bomb exploded a few hundred yards away.1  In response, the 
diplomats were moved out of the compound toward the ―Green Zone.‖  As 
they traveled through Nisour Square, a security convoy attempted to block 
traffic to ensure that the diplomats could pass through the area; some of the 
diplomats‘ guards exited the convoy to patrol the street.  One guard shot at 
an oncoming car and killed the vehicle‘s driver, along with a mother cradl-
ing her infant in the passenger seat.2  The car caught fire but continued roll-






  J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Emory University, 2004.  Thanks to 
Professor Robert W. Bennett for his teaching and comments, to Mr. Brian Scott for inspiring this Essay, 
and to the many friends who took the time to read through prior drafts. 
†
  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 27 (U.S. 1776). 
‡
  ―A Framer,‖ Letter to the Editor, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Jan. 29, 1791, at 2. 
1
  See James Glanz & Sabrina Tavernise, Blackwater Role in Shooting Said to Include Chaos, N.Y. 




  See Dina Temple-Raston, All Things Considered: Iraq Victims, Witness Recount Blackwater 
Shooting (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17284785 (link). 
3
  See James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A1, available at 
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The guards insisted that they fired out of self-defense, but an FBI in-
quiry found that the shootings were unprovoked.4  Indeed, the Iraqi gov-
ernment announced its intention to prosecute those responsible.5  But these 
guards could be neither criminally prosecuted nor court-martialed under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) because they were not members 
of the U.S. armed services.6  As privately paid soldiers of Blackwater 
Worldwide (Blackwater),7 the guards fell into a ―legal Bermuda Triangle.‖8  
In other words, they were not subject to Iraqi law due to an immunity order 
granted to private military firms (PMFs), were not subject to the UCMJ for 
the U.S. military, and were not subject to United States criminal laws be-
cause they were outside its territorial jurisdiction.9 
This is an especially troubling dilemma because private soldiers‘ duties 
in modern warfare are virtually indistinguishable from their public counter-
parts‘.  For example, private soldiers have provided security to U.S. Admin-
istrator of Iraq (and later-Ambassador) L. Paul Bremer, helped train the 




  See David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.html?pagewanted=all (link). 
5
  See Blackwater Men „Given Immunity‟, BBC NEWS, Oct. 30, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7068600.stm (link). 
6
  See, e.g., John M. Broder, Rice Says „Hole‟ in U.S. Law Shields Contractors in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 25, 2007, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/washington/26contractor.html 
(link). 
7
  Although originally named ―Blackwater USA,‖ the company changed its name and logo in Octo-
ber 2007 to ―Blackwater Worldwide‖ to improve its public image.  See Paul von Zielbauer, Blackwater 




  Nonna Gorilovskaya, Contracting Justice, DAILY MOJO, June 11, 2004, 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/dailymojo/2004/06/06_513.html (―The fallout from Abu Ghraib ex-
posed the legal Bermuda Triangle that has so far protected civilian contractors from being tried on 
charges of abuse, rape, and even murder in U.S. courts—a situation that the U.S. government has long 
refused to remedy.‖) (link). 
9
  See, e.g., K. Elizabeth Waits, Note, Avoiding the “Legal Bermuda Triangle”: The Military Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction Act‟s Unprecedented Expansion of U.S. Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Na-
tionals, 23 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 493, 494 (2006), available at 
http://www.law.arizona.edu/journals/ajicl/AJICL2006/vol232/Waits%20note.pdf (―The U.S. Army [can] 
not prosecute because, except in very narrow circumstances, civilians are not subject to prosecution un-
der the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  Similarly, U.S. civilian authorities [can] not prose-
cute because the crimes were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.‖) (link).  
But see Del Quentin Wilber & Karen DeYoung, Justice Dept. Moves Toward Charges Against Contrac-
tors in Iraq Shooting, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2008, at A01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/16/AR2008081601967.html?nav=rss_email/components (link); Posting of 
Laura Dickinson to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/10/prosecuting-military-contractors-
more.html (Oct. 1, 2007, 9:34 EST) (discussing the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Act (MEJA) as a possible solution to this dilemma) (link). 
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Iraqi army, interrogated military prisoners,10 used helicopters and chemical 
weapons,11 operated in Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina,12 and fought off 
insurgents in combat.13  This blending of responsibilities has put the legality 
of private soldiers‘ actions in limbo. 
Of course, such a commingling of roles is inevitable given the United 
States‘ increasing reliance on PMFs.  Since the end of the Cold War, the 
Pentagon‘s use of private soldiers has more than quadrupled.14  During the 
Gulf War, only 10% of soldiers in the war zone were privately paid.15  From 
1994 to 2002, however, the Department of Defense contracted with PMFs 
more than 3,000 times for a total of more than $300 billion.16  By 2008, the 
―estimated 180,000 private contractors outnumber[ed] the 160,000 US 
troops stationed in [Iraq].‖17  Indeed, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
are now the central stage for the world‘s preeminent PMFs: DynCorp Inter-
national has about 1,500 employees in Iraq; Blackwater has more than 
1,000 employees; Military Professional Resources, Inc. has about 500 em-
ployees; and Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc. has more than 50,000 contrac-





  See William D. Hartung, Comment, Outsourcing is Hell, NATION, June 7, 2004, at 6, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040607/hartung (link); Siobhan Gorman, CIA Likely Let Contractors 
Perform Waterboarding—Interrogation Work Outsourced Heavily; Legality Uncertain, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 8, 2008, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120241180470751381.html (link). 
11
  See James Risen, „05 Use of Gas by Blackwater Leaves Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/world/middleeast/10blackwater.html (link). 
12
  See Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater Down, NATION, Oct. 10, 2005, at 19, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20051010/scahill/single (―Blackwater is operating under a federal con-
tract to provide 164 armed guards for FEMA reconstruction projects in Louisiana. . . .  Before the con-
tract was announced . . . they were already on contract with [the] DHS and that they were sleeping in 
camps organized by the federal agency. . . .  ‗It strikes me . . . that that may not be the best use of mon-
ey.‘‖) (quoting Sen. Obama) (link); Posting of Noah Shachtman to WIRED NEWS Danger Room Blog, 
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/08/officials-made.html (Aug. 31, 2008, 10:21 EST) (observing how 
Blackwater, ―which famously patrolled New Orleans after Katrina—is ‗compiling a list of qualified se-
curity personnel for possible deployment into areas affected by Hurricane Gustav‘‖) (link). 
13
  See, e.g., DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZING 
SECURITY 21–22 (2005); Dana Priest, Private Guards Repel Attack on US Headquarters, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 6, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/Wash_Post-Private_guards.html 
(link). 
14
  COL. GERALD SCHUMACHER, A BLOODY BUSINESS: AMERICA‘S WAR ZONE CONTRACTORS & 
THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 12 (2006). 
15
  See JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER xv (2007). 
16
  Laura Peterson, Privatizing Combat, the New World Order, in MAKING A KILLING: THE 
BUSINESS OF WAR 5, 6 (2002), available at http://projects.publicintegrity.org/bow/report.aspx?aid=148 
(link). 
17
  Tom Baldwin, Blackwater Denies Rogue Mercenary Charge, TIMES (London), Oct. 3, 2007, at 
31, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article2577900.ece (dis-
cussing the testimony of Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, to the House of Representatives Oversight 
Committee) (link).  See also SCAHILL, supra note 15, at xvii (commenting that by the beginning of 
2007, there was ―an almost one-to-one ratio [of private contractors] to active-duty U.S. soldiers‖). 
18
  See Renae Merle, Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2006, at 
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Despite this heavy reliance on PMFs, they are subject to little official 
oversight and not much information about PMFs is publicly available 
through Freedom of Information Act requests.  The scant information that is 
now available was not provided by the government until after a series of 
tragedies sparked public calls for regulation.19 
Nevertheless, a law already exists that could significantly decrease the 
government‘s employment of PMFs: the Anti-Pinkerton Act (Section 
3108).20  Enacted in 1893 in response to violence involving the Pinkerton 
National Detective Agency, Section 3108 proscribes the government from 
employing mercenary strike-breakers.21  The Act has since been interpreted 
to apply only to quasi-military forces, and this limitation appears to include 
the PMFs currently employed by the United States.22 
When a democratic government has a monopoly on physical force and 
coercion,23 institutions are normally in place to prevent that government 
from exercising military force without public oversight.  In contrast, how-
ever, the United States‘ current use of PMFs sidesteps such oversight by ob-
fuscating the military‘s public accountability.  This provides the 
government with a great deal of unaccountable, anti-democratic power.  
Applying Section 3108 to PMFs could prevent the government from surrep-
titiously using private militaries to generate clandestine military outcomes. 
Part I reviews the modern American history of PMFs.  Part II examines 
the only direct court interpretation of the Anti-Pinkerton Act and explains 
why this law has not yet been applied to PMFs.  Part III discusses how ap-
                                                                                                                           
D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401311.html (link). 
19
  See Robert O‘Harrow, Jr., Blackwater Contracts, Short on Detail, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2007, at 
D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/12/07/AR2007120702320.html (―The State Department has released copies of 
its contracts for private security services with Blackwater Lodge and Training Center and Blackwater 
Security Consulting.  It‘s a hefty 323-page stack, and it comes with a catch: About 169 of the pages are 
blank or mostly blank.‖) (link). 
20
  5 U.S.C. § 3108 (2000). 
21
  See United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 1977).  In the 
nineteenth century, the Pinkerton‘s operated as both a detective agency and as a private bodyguard or 
military force for large business owners.  See, e.g., ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION 
IN MODERN AMERICA, 1870 TO THE PRESENT 12 (1978) (―[D]uring this period the Pinkerton Detective 
Agency, the most notorious private police force available for hire, had more men than did the U.S. Ar-
my.‖). 
22
  See infra Part II.B. 
23
  Interestingly, the statute‘s legislative history reveals underpinnings similar to Max Weber‘s con-
ception of the state as defined by the government‘s monopolization of physical force and coercion.  
Compare MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL & ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 154 (A.M. Henderson & 
Talcott Parsons trans., Oxford University Press 1964) (1947) (defining a government as ―a ‗state‘ if and 
insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force in the enforcement of its order‖), with 23 CONG. REC. 4225 (1892) (statement of Rep. 
Bryan) (stating that ―law and order should be maintained by the lawful authorities,‖ and that the use of 
armed soldiers ―should not be transferred to private individuals . . . until we are ready to acknowledge 
government a failure‖). 
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plying Section 3108 to PMFs would increase democratic accountability by 
creating transparency in the government‘s use of PMFs. 
I. THE MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY OF PRIVATE MILITARIES 
Private militaries are as old as organized warfare.  The American mili-
tary‘s dependence on them, however, has been relatively limited until recent 
times.  Although the U.S. military used private contractors in every major 
engagement since the American Revolutionary War, it was not until the 
twenty-first century that PMFs began to come into ―close[r] proximity to 
hostile enemy forces‖ than ever before.24  Now the private military industry 
has become so ubiquitous that private soldiers give combat orders to U.S. 
soldiers25 and even provide espionage and intelligence-gathering services.26 
The modern private military industry stems from a series of military 
developments in the 1990s.  After the Cold War, professional standing ar-
mies reduced their numbers all over the world.27  Without the Cold War to 
motivate the propping up of satellite nations, armed conflicts in developing 
countries became more disorganized and unprofessional.  The resulting 
troop deficiencies led many national militaries to rely on PMFs.28  And with 
the corresponding decline of communism, the ideological shift toward pri-
vatization exacerbated these developments by motivating many govern-
ments to turn past state responsibilities over to the private market.29 
PMFs generally provide three types of services.30  Some firms offer 
tactical military support, providing actual combat forces for their clients.31  
Others are consulting firms, offering strategic guidance and training servic-





  Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Con-
tractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONTR. L.J. 233, 234 (1999). 
25
  SCAHILL, supra note 15, at 123. 
26
  See, e.g., TIM SHORROCK, SPIES FOR HIRE (2008); TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE 
HISTORY OF THE CIA 512–13 (2007); Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater‟s Private Spies, NATION, June 23, 
2008, at 11–16, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080623/scahill (noting how ―70 percent of 
the US intelligence budget is going to private companies‖) (link). 
27
  See SCHUMACHER, supra note 14, at 12–13. 
28
  See, e.g., ADAM ROBERTS, THE WONGA COUP 8–13 (2006); P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 120, available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050301faessay84211/p-w-singer/outsourcing-war.html (link); Conflict, 
Inc.: Selling the Art of War (PBS television broadcast Dec. 7, 1997), transcript available at 
http://www.cdi.org/adm/1113/transcript.html (link). 
29
  See Singer, supra note 28, at 120; see also David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 1165, 1188 (1999) (discussing the privatization of police functions). 
30
  See Singer, supra note 28, at 120. 
31
  See id.; see also ROBERT YOUNG PELTON, LICENSED TO KILL: HIRED GUNS IN THE WAR ON 
TERROR 5 (2007). 
32
  See, e.g., Singer, supra note 28, at 120; SCAHILL, supra note 15, at 167–79 (noting how President 
Bush ―waived‖ a congressional ban on military assistance to Azerbaijan and in 2003 began a project 
called ―Caspian Guard‖ where PMFs would help train local forces to help those countries protect the 
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client‘s soldiers to focus on actual combat and reducing the need for addi-
tional troops.33  These categories might earlier have been cleanly defined 
and self-contained, but have since blurred after September 11, 2001—when 
PMFs saw a golden opportunity to sell more combat-oriented services.34  By 
March 18, 2004, PMFs were no longer responsible for merely providing lo-
gistical or consulting support to the U.S. military; the government had be-
come so dependent on PMFs that they were being solicited to actively 
defend U.S. forces.35 
II. THE HISTORY AND LIMITED APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-
PINKERTON ACT 
The only current restriction on the government‘s use of PMFs is that 
the government cannot contract for a security force ―at the expense of unit 
readiness.‖36  This restriction, however, is a virtual nullity given the current 
shortage of military personnel.  Indeed, the Department of Defense changed 
its policies in March 2008 to authorize private soldiers‘ direct participation 
in hostilities rather than for self-defense alone.37  But there is another cur-
rent federal statute that might be able to limit the government‘s use of 
                                                                                                                           
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline running through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey); Charles Clover & 
Demetri Sevastopulo, US Military Trained Georgian Commandos, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at 4 (―The 
US military provided combat training to 80 Georgian special forces commandos only months prior to 
Georgia‘s army assault in South Ossetia in August. . . .  The training was provided by senior US soldiers 
and two military contractors. . . .  The contractors—MPRI  and American Systems, both based in Virgin-
ia—recruited a 15-man team of former special forces soldiers to train the Georgians at the Vashlijvari 
special forces base on the outskirts of Tbilisi, part of a programme run by the US defence department.‖); 
Private US Companies Train Armies Around the World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1997, at 13; 
Robert D. Kaplan, Outsourcing Conflict, ATLANTIC UNBOUND, Sept., 2007, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200709u/kaplan-blackwater (link). 
33
  See, e.g., Singer, supra note 28, at 120; Brown & Root Supports U.S. Forces in Albania, FED. 
TIMES, May 10, 1999, at 13. 
34
  See PELTON, supra note 31, at 31 (―The chief of the CIA‘s Special Activities Division called . . . 
the next day and asked him to start recruiting contractors to be inserted into Afghanistan for paramilitary 
actions against bin Laden and company.‖). 
35
  See Walter Pincus, More Private Forces Eyed for Iraq, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at A25, 
available at http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/Wash_Post-Green_Zone.html (link).  A U.S. solicitation 
explained how ―[t]he current and projected threat and recent history of attacks directed against coalition 
forces, and thinly stretched military force requires a commercial security force that is dedicated to pro-
vide Force Protection security.‖  David Barrow, James Glanz, Richard A. Oppel, Jr., & Kate Zernike, 




  10 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1) (2000); see also U.S. DEP‘T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE FEDERAL 
ACQUISITION REG. SUPP. 237.109 (1998) [hereinafter DFARS] (touching upon DFARS 237.102-
70(a)(1), the implementing regulation for 10 U.S.C. § 2465). 
37
  See DFARS 252.225-7040(b)(3)(ii) (2008) (―Contractor personnel performing security functions 
are also authorized to use deadly force when such force reasonably appears necessary to execute their 
security mission . . . .‖). 
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PMFs: The Anti-Pinkerton Act (Section 3108).38  The following two sec-
tions introduce the historical background of Section 3108 and discuss its 
only significant treatment in court. 
A. The Historical Basis for the Anti-Pinkerton Act 
Congress‘s impetus for Section 3108 was the infamous Homestead 
Strike.  When the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers 
went on strike in Homestead, Pennsylvania, their employers retained a pri-
vate army of three-hundred Pinkertons to protect the mill.39  A deadly fire-
fight began as the Pinkertons approached the picketed mill on floating 
barges.  In response to the violence and upset that businessmen could hire 
armed soldiers to discourage labor strikes,40 Congress launched investiga-
tions into the employers‘ reliance on mercenaries in these labor disputes.41 
Congressional investigating committees heard testimony about the 
Pinkertons and other similar organizations.  Like the House investigating 
committee, the Senate investigating committee‘s report disapproved of the 
use of private armies and characterized the industry as an ―assumption of 
the State‘s authority by private citizens.‖42  Accordingly, the legislative fruit 
of the committees‘ reports—Section 3108—states, in its entirety, that: ―An 
individual employed by the Pinkerton Detective Agency, or similar organi-
zation, may not be employed by the Government of the United States or the 
government of the District of Columbia.‖43  Although Congress did not be-
lieve it could ban mercenaries altogether, it did proscribe itself from em-
ploying such forces.44 
B. United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax 
Section 3108 lay relatively dormant until 1977, when a Mr. David P. 
Weinberger sought a declaratory judgment that the government‘s contract 
with a credit reporter for information about its employees violated the near-
ly-forgotten law.  He made a textual argument, alleging that Equifax was 
―similar‖ to the Pinkerton detectives because it used comparable investiga-





  See Davidson, supra note 24, at 252–56. 
39
  See United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1977). 
40
  After a thirteen-hour battle between the two sides, approximately twenty Pinkertons and forty 
strikers had been shot.  Seven Pinkertons and nine striking workers eventually died.  MILTON MELTZER, 
BREAD—AND ROSES 1865–1915 97–99 (1991).  By the time of the Homestead incident in July 1892, 
the Pinkerton National Detective Agency had ―2,000 trained men and 30,000 reserves‖ which ―had been 
used by industrialists whenever there were strikes to be broken or unions to be smashed.‖  Id. at 94. 
41
  See S. REP. NO. 52-1280 (1893); H.R. REP. NO. 52-2447 (1893).  See also S. REP. NO. 88-447, at 
8 (1963) (providing a report on a bill to repeal the Anti-Pinkerton Act, as well as describing the congres-
sional actions surrounding the passage of that Act). 
42
  See S. REP. NO. 52-1280, at I, XV (1893). 
43
  5 U.S.C. § 3108 (2000). 
44
  See Equifax, 557 F.2d at 461–62; see also Davidson, supra note 24, at 253. 
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er, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it should look to the Pinkerton Detective 
Agency of 1892 when it was used as an exemplar.45 
In an effort to assess which organizations could fall into this category, 
the Fifth Circuit used a purposive interpretation to determine that the statute 
prohibited the federal government from contracting with any Agency that 
―offered for hire mercenary, quasi-military forces . . . and armed guards.‖46  
The court relied on the congressional debates to support its narrower read-
ing: ―The original proposition adopted by the House was a very broad one . 
. . [that] prohibited the employment of the Pinkerton force or any similar 
quasi-military organization by any officer of the Government or the District 
of Columbia . . . .‖47  Although some of the Fifth Circuit‘s language seems 
sweeping, this was a narrower interpretation of Section 3108 because the 
government regularly conducts background checks through private compa-
nies or employs private security guards.48 
United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc. is the only direct judi-
cial interpretation of Section 3108,49 and in light of its narrow interpretation, 
the statute has not been relied upon frequently.  Many federal facilities to-
day employ private security guards, and investigative work is regularly de-
legated to detective agencies.50 
Ironically, however, the Fifth Circuit‘s seemingly narrow interpretation 
is favorable to a modern-day argument against the government‘s employ-
ment of PMFs.51  Equifax‘s language prohibits the government from con-
tracting out ―quasi-military armed forces,‖ which presumably would 
include contracting with PMFs for combat-intensive tactical support.  
Therefore, under the Equifax interpretation of Section 3108, military ―lead-
ers must still consider [Section 3108‘s] restrictions when implementing the 





  See Equifax, 557 F.2d at 462. 
46
  Id. (emphasis added). 
47
  Id. at 462–63 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-447, at 8 (1963) (including description of the 1893 confe-
rence) (emphasis added)). 
48
  See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 121, 123 (M.D. Tenn. 1976) (using the Anti-
Pinkerton Act to dismiss the plaintiff‘s tort action against the United States and the Pinkerton company 
when its employees were hired to be security guards, but failing to directly interpret that statute). 
49
  See Sklansky, supra note 29, at 1215 n.297. 
50
  See id. 
51
  See Alec Klein & Steve Fainaru, Judge Halts Award Of Iraq Contract, WASH. POST, June 2, 
2007, at D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/01/AR2007060102261.html (―A federal judge yesterday ordered the mili-
tary to temporarily refrain from awarding the largest security contract in Iraq [based on the Anti-
Pinkerton Act].‖) (link).  But see Scott v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 151, 156–57 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (find-
ing that the plaintiff lacked standing as an interested party to the bidding because he could not show that 
he had any expertise or a substantial chance of being awarded the contract). 
52
  Major Gregory L. Bowman, Transforming Installation Security: Where Do We Go From Here?, 
178 MIL. L. REV. 50, 60 (2003). 
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III. THE DEMOCRATIC BENEFITS TO APPLYING THE ANTI-PINKERTON 
ACT TO MODERN PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS 
Applying Section 3108 to bar the use of PMFs for tactical operations 
would create significant democratic benefits—benefits that would far out-
weigh any difficulties such an application might entail.  Indeed, preventing 
the government from outsourcing tactical operations to PMFs and treating 
private soldiers as separate from the costs of war would generate more ac-
curate political accountability. 
A. The Need for Greater Democratic Accountability 
Very little information is available to the public about the extent of the 
United States‘ current reliance on PMFs.53  Tragedies like the Nisour Square 
incident are reminders of the responsibilities with which PMFs are en-
trusted.  Sadly, only the most egregious mistakes of PMFs are adequately 
reported.54  Furthermore, when these mistakes are entangled with the mili-
tary‘s own scandals, the public‘s irritation is mainly targeted on public offi-
cials—while the ire towards PMFs is comparatively subdued.55 
While it is true that scandalous incidents have brought the debate on 
PMFs into the democratic conversation,56 the consideration of whether to 
apply Section 3108 to this industry would spark more robust political de-
bate about the proper role of PMFs in American warfare.  In addition, such 
debate would shift the onus of PMF approval to Congress.57  While Con-
gress certainly might decide to repeal the Act and continue the United 
States‘ extensive reliance on PMFs, their investigations would probably 
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facts from lawsuits filed against PMFs,58 and the questions of the compa-
nies‘ professionalism.59  This compiled information would increase the po-
litical accountability of the government‘s use of PMFs and might also lead 
to an informed and meaningful oversight system. 
Other than what is provided by the PMF industry itself, the public cur-
rently has access to very little information about the government‘s use of 
private soldiers.  Indeed, with so many private security companies operating 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, calculating the exact number of PMF casualties is 
practically impossible.  Legislation was introduced last year by Representa-
tive Jan Schakowsky of Illinois to force the government to release detailed 
statistics on the use, names, and job descriptions of contractors in Iraq, in-
cluding information on those killed and injured.60  Representative Scha-
kowsky articulated the bill‘s rationale as one of democratic accountability: 
―By keeping the knowledge of [PMFs] hidden, it changes one‘s perception 
and one‘s evaluation of the war. . . .  I think it masks the fact that we are 
privatizing the military in this country.‖61  The bill is an example of the pub-
lic‘s desire for accurate information about the private military industry, as 
well as the importance of having an informed public dialogue about the use 
of PMFs. 
B. The Democratic Results of Applying the Anti-Pinkerton Act to Private 
Military Firms 
At the end of the day, PMFs operate in a demand-based market that re-
quires military conflicts to survive.  But if courts apply Section 3108 to ef-
fectively ban the use of PMFs for tactical military operations, much of this 
demand would—at least temporarily—be cut off.  In the wake of such a rul-
ing, Congress would have to examine the extent of the role that PMFs 
should occupy in the modern military. 
It is true that PMFs are integrated with the military system; however, 
courts applying Section 3108 to prohibit use of PMFs in tactical missions 
would allow Congress to reassess how dependent the armed services should 
be on private soldiers.  Furthermore, this reassessment, in light of the cur-
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rate information about how PMFs are actually used, allowing the electorate 
to make better-educated choices about whether to deploy military forces.  
At minimum, if the U.S. continues employing PMFs in Iraq, the electorate 
should know this fact in order to gauge effectively its desire for a longer 
and costlier military engagement. 
Finally, with many PMFs carrying out tactical functions, it is likely 
that these forces could detract from (or be a distraction to) the U.S. mili-
tary‘s own objectives.62  Such a conflict certainly occurred when Blackwa-
ter soldiers were massacred in Falluja in 2004.63  The Iraqis responsible 
believed that they were exacting revenge on American soldiers, failing to 
distinguish between public and private military operatives.64  Nevertheless, 
the U.S. military eventually had to resolve their resulting image problems in 
Falluja.65  This sort of scenario is an everyday risk for the U.S. military, and 
it is ultimately the American public that must bear the costs when PMF ac-
tions are unsuccessful.  The proper functioning of American democracy 
would be better served by forcing a congressional debate on PMFs. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the U.S. military‘s current reliance on PMFs, an open and in-
formed debate on which roles, if any, are appropriate for private soldiers is 
best for the American people.  While tragic actions by PMFs have provided 
an impetus for greater regulation of the private military industry, applica-
tion of the Anti-Pinkerton Act could force a national political debate.  And 
with greater political accountability, officials might become more cautious 
when mediating future military engagements.66  Consequently, the statute 
could force Congress to exercise its Article I power under the War Powers 
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integration of such firms in the war on terrorism.  The present—and unac-
ceptable—legal void in dealing with the private military industry might be 
successfully remedied if a meaningful, honest, and open debate were al-
lowed to occur. 
